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INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND THE LAW 
OF FRACKING FLUID DISCLOSURES: 





Hydraulic fracturing is a controversial, yet invaluable, facet of the 
American energy industry. Among the myriad of environmental issues 
posed by hydraulic fracturing, the chemically treated fluids used in the 
fracturing process have engendered significant public concern, resulting in 
a growing push to mandate the disclosure of fluid formulas. In response, 
the energy industry has resisted these efforts by treating the formulas as 
trade secrets. Presently, the fight over fracking fluid disclosures is a 
stalemate between the public’s right to know the chemical contents injected 
into the earth and the energy industry’s right to protect its proprietary 
trade secrets. Indeed, while a growing number of state regulations require 
the disclosure of fracking fluid formulas, every one of these regulations 
includes an exception for trade secrets.  
Given the unceasing doctrinal tension and lack of uniform regulation in 
this area, commentators have proposed that the proper balance between 
public disclosure and competitive incentives lies in the use of patents to 
protect fracking fluids. However, this Note argues that patents are 
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untenable as a means of protecting fracking fluid formulas for many of the 
existing operators in the energy industry. Specifically, I contend that 
patentability issues like novelty and the public use bar, coupled with the 
practical problems of patent prosecution, eliminate patents as a viable 
alternative to trade secret protections for most fracking operators. 
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I. Introduction 
In 1997, a revolution began on the north Texas plains that revitalized the 
American energy sector and permanently altered the geopolitical landscape. 
Ultimately, the “revolution” that began in Texas’s Barnett Shale brought 
hydraulic fracturing (“fracking”) into the energy sector’s mainstream and 
ushered in a boom in domestic oil and gas production.  
However, as fracking spread to shale plays throughout the country, 
environmental concerns and controversy spread with it. Chief among these 
concerns are the environmental risks posed by the fluids used to fracture the 
shale, specifically the risk that chemicals in the fracking fluids may 
contaminate groundwater sources or spread on the surface in the event of an 
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/onej/vol6/iss3/7
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accident on a fracking well. In the eyes of the energy sector, the specific 
compositions of fracking fluids, which often include specially formulated 
chemical additives, are valuable and confidential information—the kind of 
intellectual property protected through the law of trade secrets. Conversely, 
because of the potential environmental harms involved, environmentalists, 
citizen groups, and government agencies have treated fracking fluid 
compositions as information the public has a right to know. 
These conflicting views are locked in tremendous tension. At its core, 
this tension involves balancing “the public’s interest in identifying 
chemicals which may find their way into groundwater, and the industry’s 
need to protect proprietary information in order to maintain a competitive 
advantage.”
1
 Repeated attempts to strike this balance with mandatory 
disclosure regulations at the federal level have failed. Thus, fracking fluid 
regulation has been relegated entirely to the states. While state fracking 
regulations have shed some light on fluid compositions, every mandatory 
fluid disclosure regulation implemented to date includes an exception for 
trade secrets and proprietary information.  
This Note will address the inherent tension between fracking disclosure 
regulations and the fracking operators’ right to protect their intellectual 
property and will examine the viability of using patents as a meaningful 
compromise between protection and disclosure. Part I introduces fracking 
and its vital role in oil and gas production, along with the basic tenets of 
trade secret law—fracking operators’ preferred means of protecting their 
fluid compositions. Additionally, Part I will address the environmental 
concerns surrounding fracking fluids and the push for mandatory disclosure 
regulations. Part II will provide an overview of the lack of federal fracking 
fluid regulation and the framework of existing regulatory schemes used by 
the states. Part III will discuss the tensions between trade secrets and 
disclosure schemes as illustrated by two highly controversial problem areas: 
(1) the public’s push for greater transparency and litigation involving 
records requests for fracking disclosures and (2) the medical community’s 
calls for greater access to fracking fluid compositions. Part IV will examine 
the growing trend of “fracking patents”—fracking technology and fluids 
protected under the patent system rather than trade secret law. Ultimately, 
this Note will evaluate the relative advantages of “fracking patents,” and 
conclude that patents are a superior, yet impractical, means of protecting 
fracking fluid technologies for most operators, and that the patent system is 
                                                                                                             
 1. Powder River Basin Res. Council v. Wyo. Oil & Gas Conservation Comm’n, 2014 
WY 37, 320 P.3d 222, 225 (Wyo. 2014). 
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not a long-term solution for the intractable tension between fracking fluids 
and the public’s right to disclosure. 
A. Hydraulic Fracturing and the “Shale Revolution”  
At its most basic, fracking is “the injection of fluid into shale beds at 
high pressure in order to free up petroleum resources.”
2
 More specifically, 
hydraulic fracturing is a process by which a well is stimulated with 
specially blended liquids injected into a high-pressure formation, causing 
the formation to crack open and allowing oil or gas to flow into the 
wellbore.
3
 The most prevalent form of hydraulic fracturing is “slickwater 
fracking,” which involves pumping chemically treated fluid into the well 
with “proppants” used to keep the fractures open and create a more 
consistent flow of oil or gas.
4
 These chemically treated “slickwater” fluids 
are at the core of the controversy over public disclosure and the focus of 
this Note.  
Despite its recent prominence, fracking is not a recent invention. 
Fracking technology was invented by the Stanolind Oil & Gas Company in 
1947.
5
 Over the next four decades, fracking technology proliferated steadily 
but unremarkably, with its primary use in traditional “vertical” wells.
6
 
Although fracking was recognized for its usefulness in low-permeability 
geological formations,
7
 fracking was not utilized in shales—tightly packed 
geological formations made up of “finely divided particles of older rocks.”
8
  
Then, in 1997, the fracking “game” changed when Mitchell Energy 
utilized slickwater hydraulic fracturing in the Barnett Shale outside of Fort 
Worth.
9
 Mitchell’s unconventional use of fracking in the tight shale 
formation generated “remarkable” results—after ninety days of operation, 
Mitchell’s S.H. Griffin No. 3 well produced more than one million cubic 
                                                                                                             
 2. HOWARD R. WILLIAMS & CHARLES J. MEYERS, MANUAL OF OIL & GAS TERMS at 
“F” (Matthew Bender & Co. Inc., 17th ed. 2018).  
 3. Id.  
 4. John D. Furlow & John R. Hays Jr., Disclosure with Protection of Trade Secrets 
Comes to the Hydraulic Fracturing Revolution, 7 TEX. J. OIL GAS & ENERGY L. 289, 295 
(2011). 
 5. Kristen van de Biezenbos, Contracted Fracking, 92 TUL. L. REV. 587, 597 (2018). 
 6. See Keith B. Hall, Hydraulic Fracturing: Trade Secrets and the Mandatory 
Disclosure of Fracturing Water Composition, 49 IDAHO L. REV. 399, 403 (2013). 
 7. See id. at 404. 
 8. Manual of Oil & Gas Terms, supra note 3, at “S.” 
 9. Furlow & Hays, supra note 4, at 297.  
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feet of natural gas, a record for the formation at the time.
10
 By 2001, 
Mitchell’s Barnett wells were producing 365 million cubic feet of natural 
gas a day, a 250% increase from production just two years prior.
11
 Despite 
Mitchell’s success in the Barnett, the turning point of the fracking 
revolution came in 2002 when Devon Energy, an Oklahoma-based 
hydrocarbon exploration company, acquired Mitchell.
12
 Devon combined 
Mitchell’s slickwater fracking techniques with its expertise—the process of 
horizontal drilling. With horizontal drilling, the wellbore angles 
horizontally after it reaches a certain depth, penetrating a greater length of 
the carbon reservoir and offering significant production improvements over 
traditional vertical drilling.
13
 This combination proved incredibly effective 
in the tightly packed Barnett Shale, and it represented a “worldwide 
breakthrough” in fracking as a means of oil and gas production.
14
  
Thus, the so-called “shale revolution” was born with Devon’s 
combination of slickwater fracking and horizontal drilling.
15
 The production 
boom in the Barnett led to massive growth in natural gas shale development 
across the country. Throughout the 2000s, the combination of fracking and 
horizontal drilling was used to develop shale plays like the Haynesville 
Shale in east Texas and Louisiana, the Fayetteville Shale in Arkansas, and 




During this time, shale gas production in the United States grew 
exponentially. In 2002, the United States produced 5.2 trillion cubic feet of 
shale gas.
17
 In 2019, it produced 26.2 trillion cubic feet of shale gas.
18
 
                                                                                                             
 10. Gregory Zuckerman, Breakthrough: The Accidental Discovery That Revolutionized 
American Energy, THE ATLANTIC (Nov. 6, 2013), https://www.theatlantic.com/business/ 
archive/2013/11/breakthrough-the-accidental-discovery-that-revolutionized-american-
energy/281193/.  
 11. Id.  
 12. R. Marcus Cady, II, Drilling into the Issues: A Critical Analysis of Urban Drilling’s 
Legal, Environmental, and Regulatory Implications, 16 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 127, 133 
(2009). 
 13. Furlow & Hays, supra note 4, at 291 n.3. 
 14. Daniel R. Cahoy et al., Fracking Patents: The Emergence of Patent as Information-
Containment Tools in Shale Drilling, 19 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 279, 286 
(2013). 
 15. THE U.S. SHALE REVOLUTION, https://www.strausscenter.org/energy-and-security/ 
the-u-s-shale-revolution.html#FN1, (last visited Mar. 25, 2020). 
 16. Hall, supra note 6, at 404.  
 17. NATURAL GAS EXPLAINED, U.S. Energy Information Administration, https://www. 
eia.gov/energyexplained/natural-gas/where-our-natural-gas-comes-from.php, (last visited 
Mar. 25, 2020).  
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Moreover, the shale revolution caused shale gas to play an outsized role in 
American natural gas production—it accounted for 27.3% of the natural gas 
produced in 2002; in 2019, 81% of American natural gas was shale gas.
19
 
Perhaps more importantly, the shale revolution drastically altered the 
crude oil industry. While the initial fracking boom focused on natural gas, 
energy producers were quick to utilize fracking and horizontal drilling in 
shale formations that produce oil.
20
 The fracking of this “tight oil” now 
accounts for 61% of U.S. crude oil production.
21
 Four key shale plays 
account for 87% of all tight oil prod**uction: the Bakken in Montana and 
North Dakota (32%), the Eagle Ford in Texas (28%), the Permian in Texas 
and New Mexico (23%), and the Niobrara-Codell in Colorado and 
Wyoming (4%).
22
 This newfound boom in tight oil has allowed the United 
States to equal or surpass Saudi Arabia in crude oil production every year 
since 2013
23
 and has led to a significant decrease in America’s dependence 
on foreign crude oil.
24
 
In short, fracking is an economic and geopolitical force that has 
catalyzed significant growth in the United States and added hundreds of 
thousands of jobs to the energy sector.
25
 
B. Fracking and the Law of Trade Secrets  
Every jurisdiction in the United States recognizes protection for trade 
secrets.
26
 The vast majority of these jurisdictions have adopted the 
provisions of the Uniform Trade Secrets Act (“UTSA”).
27
 According to the 
UTSA:  
                                                                                                             
 18. Id. 
 19. Id. 
 20. Hall, supra note 6, at 404–05. 
 21. HOW MUCH SHALE (TIGHT) OIL IS PRODUCED IN THE UNITED STATES?, U.S. Energy 
Information Administration, https://www.eia.gov/tools/faqs/faq.php?id=847&t=6, (last 
visited Mar. 25, 2020).  
 22. Id.  
 23. PETROLEUM AND OTHER LIQUIDS DATA, U.S. Energy Information Administration, 
https://www.eia.gov/international/data/world, (last visited Mar. 25, 2020).  
 24. THE U.S. SHALE REVOLUTION, supra note 15. 
 25. Id. 
 26. PETER S. MENNELL, MARK A. LEMLEY & ROBERT P. MERGES, INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY IN THE NEW TECHNOLOGICAL AGE: 2019, VOLUME I: PERSPECTIVES, TRADE 
SECRETS AND PATENTS 47 (Clause 8 Publishing, 2019). 
 27. Id. 
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(4) “Trade Secret” means information, including a formula, 
pattern, compilation, program, device, method, technique, or 
process that:  
(i) derives independent economic value, actual or potential, 
from not being generally known to, and not being readily 
ascertainable by proper means by, other persons who can 
obtain economic value from its disclosure or use, and  
(ii) is the subject of efforts that are reasonable under the 
circumstances to maintain its secrecy.
28
  
The UTSA’s definition of a trade secret emphasizes the secret’s 
economic value to its owner. This economic rationale is ingrained in the 
requirement that a trade secret holder must make reasonable efforts to 
protect the secret from disclosure.
29
 At bottom, a trade secret claim has 
three essential elements: (1) the subject matter involved must be the type of 
knowledge or information protected by trade secret law; (2) the knowledge 
or information must be subject to reasonable precautions to protect its 
secrecy; and (3) the plaintiff must establish that the defendant 
misappropriated the trade secret.
30
 
While trade secret law has historically been grounded in doctrines of tort 
law and property rights, the modern approach has been to view trade secrets 
as intellectual property rights that incentivize innovation in the 
marketplace.
31
 In this vein, fracking operators have treated various aspects 
of their fracking fluids as confidential trade secrets to maintain an 
advantage over their competitors.
32
 Specifically, fracking operators use 
trade secret law to protect the overall composition of their fracking fluids, 
specific chemical additives, the blending process, and ratios of the fluid.
33
 
Moreover, courts have generally allowed fracking operators to protect their 
                                                                                                             
 28. UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(4) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1985).  
 29. MENNELL, LEMLEY & MERGES, supra note 26, at 49.  
 30. Id. 
 31. See Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 481–85 (1974) (“Trade secret 
law will encourage invention in areas where patent law does not reach, and will prompt the 
independent innovator to proceed with the discovery and exploitation of his invention. 
Competition is fostered and the public is not deprived of the use of valuable, if not quite 
patentable, inventions.”).  
 32. Hall, supra note 6, at 406. 
 33. John D. Furlow & Corinne V. Snow, In the Wake of the Shale Revolution: A Primer 
on Hydraulic Fracturing Fluid Chemical Disclosure, 8 TEX. J. OIL GAS & ENERGY L. 249, 
260 (2012). 
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In addition to protecting fracking operators from “competitive injury” at 
the hands of competitors and former employees, trade secret protections 
have served to prevent the disclosure of fluid compositions to regulators 
and the public.
35
 Effectively, fracking operators have used their interest in 
protecting proprietary information to defeat every attempt to mandate the 
complete disclosure of fluid compositions, as evidenced by the fact that 




C. Environmental Concerns and the Push for Mandatory Disclosure 
Although fracking fluids are predominantly composed of water and sand 
(typically around 99% of the fluid), there is significant public concern that 
the chemical additives of the slickwater fluids contain harmful 
carcinogens.
37
 The genesis of this concern is the possibility that chemicals 
in the fluids will enter ground- and surface-water during the fracking 
process, creating the potential for human ingestion.
38
 This concern is 
bolstered by studies that have identified a link between water contamination 
and the flow and discharge of slickwater fluid in areas where fracking is 
common.
39
 More specifically, researchers have identified unusually high 
concentrations of chemicals like methane in “active” fracking areas.
40
 Other 
studies have identified chemical contamination in groundwater sources 
around active fracking areas in West Virginia and Kentucky.
41
 
                                                                                                             
 34. See Core Labs. LP v. Spectrum Tracer Servs., L.L.C., 532 F. App’x 904, 909–10 
(Fed. Cir. 2013) (applying Texas law). 
 35. John M. Golden & Hannah J. Wiseman, The Fracking Revolution: Shale Gas as a 
Case Study in Innovation Policy, 64 EMORY L.J. 955, 962 (2015). 
 36. See infra Part II.B.  
 37. Julie E. Zink, When Trade Secrecy Goes Too Far: Public Health and Safety Should 
Trump Corporate Profits, 20 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 1135, 1158 (2018). 
 38. Id. at 1159; Elliott Fink, Note, Dirty Little Secrets: Fracking Fluids, Dubious Trade 
Secrets, Confidential Contamination, and the Public Health Information Vacuum, 29 
FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 971, 983 (2019). 
 39. Stephen G. Osborn et al., Methane Contamination of Drinking Water Accompanying 
Gas-Well Drilling and Hydraulic Fracturing, 108 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 8172, 8172–73 
(2011). 
 40. Id. at 8173.  
 41. U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, MGMT. OF WASTES FROM THE EXPLORATION, 
DEV., AND PROD. OF CRUDE OIL, NATURAL GAS, AND GEOTHERMAL ENERGY (1987), 
https://archive.epa.gov/epawaste/nonhaz/industrial/special/web/pdf/530sw88003a.pdf. 
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Although these studies have not conclusively identified fracking as the 
cause of the contamination, they have led to increased calls for government 
regulation of fracking and the mandatory disclosure of fracking fluid 
compositions.
42
 This pro-regulation movement has been amplified by high-
profile fracking incidents, like the 2014 explosion of a fracking well in 
Monroe County, Ohio that released thousands of gallons of fracking fluids 
into Opossum Creek, a tributary of the Ohio River.
43
 The introduction of 
chemicals from the well site into the Ohio River exacted a significant 
ecological toll on the area and killed over 70,000 fish.
44
 In the wake of the 
Monroe County incident, it took Halliburton, the well’s operator, five days 
to disclose the chemical contents of the fracking fluids involved to federal, 
state, and local authorities.
45
 The fact that the firefighters responding to the 
Monroe County incident, as well as the EPA and Ohio state authorities, 
were kept in the dark about the chemicals involved attracted significant 
media attention and garnered a comment from then-Governor John Kasich, 
who stated that first responders should always have access to the chemicals 
at wells sites, “including the ones protected by trade-secret laws.”
46
 
Due in large part to outrage over incidents like the Monroe County fire, 
the threat of chemically treated fluids has become “the most contentious 
issue” in the larger debate surrounding oil and gas production.
47
 This 
contentiousness is exacerbated by a perceived lack of effective state and 
federal regulation.
48
 Indeed, a contemporary slate of federal legislation 
aimed at regulating fracking and mandating the disclosure of fluid 
compositions died on the congressional floor.
49
 Simultaneous efforts at 
state-level fracking regulation have met varying degrees of success, but 
                                                                                                             
 42. See Abrahm Lustgarten, Scientific Study Links Flammable Drinking Water to 
Fracking, PROPUBLICA (May 9, 2011, 2:00 PM), https://www.propublica.org/article/ 
scientific-study-links-flammable-drinking-water-to-fracking (citing the Osborn study in note 
36). 
 43. Fink, supra note 38, at 973.  
 44. Id. 
 45. Laura Arenschield, Fracking Fire Points out Failings, THE COLUMBUS DISPATCH 
(Aug. 31, 2014), https://www.dispatch.com/article/20140831/NEWS/308319916.  
 46. Id.; Mariah Blake, Halliburton Fracking Spill Mystery: What Chemicals Polluted an 
Ohio Waterway?, MOTHER JONES (July 24, 2014), https://www.motherjones.com/ 
politics/2014/07/halliburton-ohio-river-spill-fracking/.  
 47. Furlow & Hays, supra note 4, at 314.  
 48. See id. at 317. 
 49. See Fracturing Responsibility and Awareness of Chemicals Act of 2011, H.R. 1084, 
112th Cong. (2011); FUEL Act, H.R. 2133, 112th Cong. (2011); FRAC Act, S. 587, 112th 
Cong. (2011). 
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Thus, opponents of secrecy in the fracking process were initially left 
with voluntary disclosure measures within the oil and gas industry. The 
progress of these voluntary efforts was slow and incomplete—fracking 
operators invariably refused to disclose the compounds that were “most 
critical” to their trade secrets, but “the information disclosed nevertheless 
was more information than had been publicly disclosed before.”
51
 The most 
substantial voluntary development has been the emergence of FracFocus, a 
private entity, as a platform for fracking operators to publicly disclose their 
drilling practices.
52
 As a tool of “private governance,” FracFocus proved to 
be so effective that it is expressly referenced as an acceptable disclosure 
platform in several state fracking regulation regimes.
53
 
However, despite the incremental progress of voluntary fracking 
disclosures, opponents of stringent trade secret protections in fracking 




II. Federal and State Regulation of Fracking Fluids 
The push for greater transparency in fracking has culminated in 
increased government regulation of fracking fluids. That said, federal 
regulation of the fracking industry is currently nonexistent, and the 
possibility of any renewed federal efforts is “problematic at best.”
55
 Thus, 
the most important regulatory efforts in the fracking industry are led by the 
states.
56
 States vary in the scope and rigidity of their regulations. 
Consequently, the most pronounced tensions between fracking fluid 
disclosure efforts and fracking operators’ rights to their intellectual property 
play out at the state level.  
  
                                                                                                             
 50. See infra Part II.B. 
 51. Hall, supra note 6, at 406. 
 52. See Amanda C. Leiter, Fracking as a Federalism Case Study, 85 U. COLO. L. REV. 
1123, 1127 (2014). 
 53. Id. at 1127–28. 
 54. Fink, supra note 38, at 989–90. 
 55. Bruce M. Kramer, Federal Legislative and Administrative Regulation of Hydraulic 
Fracturing Operations, 44 TEX. TECH L. REV. 837, 862 (2012). 
 56. See, e.g., William C. Mumby, Trust in Local Government: How States’ Legal 
Obligations to Protect Water Resources Can Support Local Efforts to Restrict Fracking, 44 
ECOLOGY L.Q. 195, 202 (2017). 
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A. Federal Regulation of Fracking Fluids is Nonexistent   
In 2016, Judge Scott Skavdahl of the District of Wyoming unequivocally 
concluded that “Congress has expressly removed federal agency authority 
to regulate [hydraulic fracturing].”
57
 Although the district court’s opinion 
was vacated on appeal because the Bureau of Land Management rescinded 
the regulation at issue, Judge Skavdahl’s statement of the law on federal 
fracking regulation is accurate.
58
 Simply put, fracking per se is excluded 
from every meaningful federal environmental statute. 
Transparency and public participation are routinely heralded as 
hallmarks of American environmental statutes.
59
 Nevertheless, fracking is 
excluded from each of the relevant statutory candidates to shed light on 
fracking fluid compositions. For instance, the Clean Water Act expressly 
carves out “water, gas, or other material which is injected into a well to 
facilitate production of oil or gas, or water derived in association with oil or 
gas production and disposed of in a well . . . .”
60
 Similarly, fracking fluids, 
like other oil and gas wastes, are exempted from the hazardous waste 




Even statutes passed with the clear goal of promoting transparency and 
safety in industrial settings do not cover fracking fluids. Specifically, the 
Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act (“EPCRA”), 
which was passed in the wake of the Bhopal disaster to protect communities 
from toxic hazards, does not presently cover oil and gas facilities in its 
“Standard Industrial Classification.”
62
 Similar regulatory efforts, such as the 
                                                                                                             
 57. State of Wyo. v. U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, No. 2:15-CV-041-SWS, 2016 WL 
3509415, at *11 (D. Wyo. June 21, 2016), judgment vacated, appeal dismissed sub nom. 
Wyo. v. Zinke, 871 F.3d 1133 (10th Cir. 2017). 
 58. See Zinke, 871 F.3d at 1146.  
 59. See, e.g., Jeffrey G. Miller, Garrison Summary–A Generational History of 
Environmental Law and its Grand Themes: A Near Decade of Garrison Lectures, 19 PACE 
ENVTL. L. REV. 501, 506–07 (2002). 
 60. 33 U.S.C. § 1362(6) (2019).  
 61. See 42 U.S.C. § 6291(b)(2)(A) (2006); see also Michael Goldman, Drilling into 
Hydraulic Fracturing and Shale Gas Development: A Texas and Federal Environmental 
Perspective, 19 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 185, 203 (2012) (explaining that the RCRA was 
amended in 1980 to allow the EPA to determine whether fracking was covered by RCRA, 
and that, “due to the economic importance of oil and gas development,” the EPA determined 
federal regulation was unwarranted).  
 62. See 42 U.S.C. § 11023(b)(1)(B) (2019). However, an emergency report would likely 
be required if a fluid release exceeded certain thresholds set by the EPA. See 42 U.S.C. § 
11004(a)(2)(B) (2018). 
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rules promulgated by the Occupational Safety and Health Administration 
(“OSHA”), do not require fracking operators to disclose specific chemical 
compositions or their quantities.
63
 
The threat to drinking water is at the heart of the public debate over 
fracking practices. Accordingly, it is unsurprising that much of the 
acrimony and litigation about the federal regulation of fracking fluids 
centers on the Safe Drinking Water Act (“SDWA”).
64
 The SDWA was 
enacted in 1974 to prevent the degradation of drinking water, with 
Underground Injection Control (“UIC”) programs serving as the primary 
enforcement mechanism of the Act.
65
 Through the UIC program, the EPA 
and state agencies are responsible for permitting and regulating operations 
involving “underground injections.”
66
 A state must submit a proposed UIC 
program to the EPA that meets the minimum requirements established by 
the SDWA.
67
 If the EPA approves the state’s proposed UIC program, the 
state assumes primary regulatory authority and enforcement responsibility 
for underground injection activities.
68
  
However, from 1974 through 1997, the EPA consistently determined that 
fracking did not fall within the SDWA’s definition of an “underground 
injection.”
69
 The EPA did not reevaluate this position until the Eleventh 
Circuit declared it unreasonable in the so-called LEAF litigation.
70
 The 
LEAF cases began when the EPA denied the Legal Environmental 
Assistance Foundation’s (“LEAF”) petition to withdraw the EPA’s 
approval of Alabama’s UIC program.
71
 Alabama’s UIC program, which the 
EPA approved in two parts over 1982 and 1983, did not regulate fracking as 
an underground injection activity.
72
 LEAF contended that the SWDA 
required fracking regulation.
73
 In response, the EPA took the position that 
hydraulic fracturing is not an “underground injection” within the meaning 
                                                                                                             
 63. See 29 C.F.R. § 1910.120 (2019) (does not mandate the disclosure of specific 
chemical components or quantities).  
 64. Safe Drinking Water Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 300h–300h-8 (2005).  
 65. 42 U.S.C. §§ 300h-1–300h-3.  
 66. Id. 
 67. 42 U.S.C. § 300h-1. 
 68. Id. 
 69. See Fink, supra note 38, at 987; see also Kramer, supra note 55, at 848–49.  
 70. Legal Envtl. Assistance Found., Inc. v. U.S. E.P.A. (LEAF I), 118 F.3d 1467, 1471 
(11th Cir. 1997); Legal Envtl. Assistance Found., Inc. v. U.S. E.P.A. (LEAF II), 276 F.3d 
1253, 1255 (11th Cir. 2001). 
 71. LEAF I, 118 F.3d at 1469.  
 72. See id. at 1470–71.  
 73. Id. at 1471.  
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of the SDWA because that term “encompass[es] only those wells whose 
‘principal function’ is the underground emplacement of fluids.”
74
  
Because the EPA’s order denying LEAF’s initial petition was a final 
agency action, the Eleventh Circuit took up LEAF’s petition for review.
75
 
The court applied the Chevron framework and found that the EPA’s 
interpretation failed at the first step of the analysis—it failed to effectuate 
Congress’s unambiguously expressed intent.
76
 Because fracking involves 
“subsurface emplacement,” the court concluded that it “obviously” fell 
under the ordinary meaning of underground injection.
77
 Thus, the court held 
that the EPA exceeded its authority and contravened the plain meaning of 
the SDWA by failing to regulate fracking.
78
 Subsequent disagreements over 
the specifics of Alabama’s modified UIC program necessitated a petition 
for a writ of mandamus that brought the parties back before the Eleventh 
Circuit.
79
 While the LEAF litigation did not ultimately lead the EPA to alter 
or review other states’ UIC programs, it did “lead to a reevaluation of the 
EPA’s role in regulating hydraulic fracturing.”
80
 
Whatever reform that reevaluation brought with it was, however, short-
lived. In 2005, Congress enacted the Energy Policy Act, which amended the 
SDWA’s definitions by specifically excluding “the underground injection 
of fluids or propping agents (other than diesel fuels) pursuant to hydraulic 




As a result, there is no current federal legislation regulating hydraulic 
fracking fluids. Multiple iterations of the Fracturing Responsibility and 
Awareness of Chemicals Act (“FRAC Act”), which would bring fracking 
under the SDWA and mandate the disclosure of fluid compositions, have 
failed in Congress.
82
 Regulatory efforts to fill the legislative void have met 
the same fate. For instance, the Department of the Interior (“DOI”) 
promulgated fracking regulations in 2015 that implemented limitations 
                                                                                                             
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. at 1472. 
 76. Id. at 1477–78 (citing Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 
U.S. 837 (1984)).  
 77. Id. at 1474–75. 
 78. Id. at 1477–78. 
 79. LEAF II, 276 F.3d at 1255. 
 80. Kramer, supra note 55, at 853.  
 81. Energy Policy Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-58, § 322, 119 Stat. 594, 694 (codified 
as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 300h (2005)).  
 82. FRAC Act, S. 587, 112th Cong. (2011); S. 1135, 113th Cong. (2013); S. 785, 114th 
Cong. (2015); S. 865, 115th Cong. (2017). 
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similar to the SDWA on federal and Native American lands.
83
 The state of 
Wyoming challenged DOI’s agency action in federal court, and the court 
enjoined DOI from enforcing the regulations on the ground that DOI did 
not have congressional authority to regulate fracking.
84
 This decision 
culminated in the court’s emphatic conclusion that Congress had “expressly 
removed federal agency authority to regulate [fracking] . . . .”
85
 President 
Trump took office during the pendency of DOI’s appeal, and the Trump 
Administration subsequently rescinded the DOI’s fracking regulation, 
rendering the case unripe for decision.
86
  
Thus, the federal government has removed itself from the regulatory 
arena when it comes to fracking, leaving issues like fracking fluid 
disclosure to the states. 
B. State Fracking Fluid Regulations 
As of 2019, twenty-eight states have enacted statutes regulating the 
disclosure of fracking fluid compositions.
87
 At a “general level,” these 
regulations are similar: they all require fracking operators to disclose the 
composition of fracking fluids, and they all exempt trade secrets from 
disclosure.
88
 Moreover, most state disclosure regulations require trade 
secret holders to disclose chemical information to first responders in the 
wake of spills or medical emergencies.
89
 The distinctions among the various 
states primarily come in three areas: first, the method and timing of the 
required disclosure;
90
 second, the depth of detail required in the operator’s 
                                                                                                             
 83. Oil and Gas; Hydraulic Fracturing on Federal and Indian Lands, 80 Fed. Reg. 
16,128 (Mar. 26, 2015) (codified at 43 C.F.R. § 3162.3 (rescinded)). 
 84. State of Wyo. v. U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, No. 2:15-CV-041-SWS, 2016 WL 
3509415, at *12 (D. Wyo. June 21, 2016), judgment vacated, appeal dismissed sub nom. 
Wyo. v. Zinke, 871 F.3d 1133 (10th Cir. 2017). 
 85. State of Wyo., 2016 WL 3509415, at *11.  
 86. Zinke, 871 F.3d at 1145. 
 87. Lara D. Pringle, A Closer Look at Hydraulic Fracturing: An Examination of How 
Various States Address Fracturing Fluid Disclosure Requirements and Baseline Testing for 
Groundwater, in THE LAW OF FRACKING: FEDERAL, STATE, AND LOCAL REGULATION OF 
MODERN OIL & GAS DEVELOPMENT (Rocky Mtn. Min. L. Inst., 2019). 
 88. Hall, supra note 6, at 409. 
 89. See Furlow & Snow, supra note 33, at 265–66. 
 90. Compare N.M. CODE R. 19.15.16.19 (2017) (operators must file disclosure on 
FracFocus within forty-five days of completing the well), with MONT. ADMIN. R. 36.22.608 
(2018) (operators must disclose fluids to state oil and gas board forty-eight hours before 
starting drilling).  
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 finally, and most contentiously, the extent to which the 




1. Methods and Timing of Fracking Fluid Disclosure 
Most states that regulate fracking fluid disclosures either require or allow 
operators to file their disclosures on FracFocus rather than with a regulatory 
body.
93
 While FracFocus began as a private platform for fracking operators 
to make voluntary disclosures, states have adopted it as a central database 
for fracking information.
94
 Due in part to pressure from state regulators, 
FracFocus was upgraded in 2013 to include more user-friendly features, 
such as allowing users to search by chemical ingredients in addition to 
searching by well locations.
95
 That said, regulators have not universally 
accepted FracFocus, and some maintain independent public disclosure 




Just as most states allow operators to post their fluid composition 
disclosures to FracFocus, most states only require post-fracking disclosures, 
“typically [within] 30 to 60 days after the fracturing is complete.”
97
 
Because the purpose of fracking fluid disclosures is to provide accurate 
information to the public, the prevailing attitude is that pre-fracking 
disclosures are unnecessary.
98
 Moreover, fracking operators typically adjust 
                                                                                                             
 91. Compare OKLA. ADMIN. CODE § 165:10-3-10 (2019) (operators must disclose base 
fluid, each ingredient in chemical additives, and the maximum concentration of the chemical 
additives), with LA. ADMIN. CODE. tit. 43, pt. XIX § 118(C)(1)(d) (2015) (operators only 
required to disclose chemical additives that are subject to federal regulation as hazardous).  
 92. Compare CODE ARK. R. § 178.00.1-B-19 (2017) (requiring operator to make written 
claim for trade secret protection to state oil and gas commission), with TEX. ADMIN. CODE. § 
3.29(c)(2)(C) (2012) (R.R. Comm’n of Tex., Hydraulic Fracturing Chemical Disclosure 
Requirements) (operators not required to submit verification for trade secret protection).  
 93. See Pringle, supra note 87.  
 94. Hall, supra note 6, at 429. 
 95. See Pringle, supra note 87. 
 96. See, e.g., ILL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 62, § 245.720 (2020) (Department of Natural 
Resources responsible for publishing “master lists” of chemical disclosures); IDAHO ADMIN. 
CODE r. 20.07.02.211 (2019) (requires disclosure of chemical composition but does not 
provide a platform for public access, records available on request).  
 97. Pringle, supra note 87. 
 98. Hall, supra note 6, at 424 (“[T]here seems to be little point in requiring a pre-
fracturing disclosure”); Pringle, supra note 87 (“The primary purpose of the disclosure 
requirements is to make information available to the public, researchers, and regulators, 
which is accomplished by post fracturing chemical disclosures.”).  
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2021
458 Oil and Gas, Natural Resources, and Energy Journal [Vol. 6 
  
 
their fluid compositions from well to well, so the composition listed in a 
pre-fracking disclosure is not guaranteed to be the final formula.
99
 As a 
result, pre-fracking disclosures requirements are uncommon.
100
 
2. Scope of Required Disclosures  
The successful push for state-level regulation has increased the amount 
of publicly available information on fracking fluids. However, the scope of 
this information varies by state. 
Because the public’s right to know the chemical composition of fracking 
fluids is a central tenet of state regulations, it is unsurprising that most 
states require fracking operators to disclose the chemical make-up and 
concentrations of their fluids.
101
 The majority approach is to require 
fracking operators to disclose all chemical constituents contained in 
fracking fluids and their quantities, with a general exception for trade 
secrets.
102
 A minority of states only require fracking operators to disclose 
chemicals that qualify as “hazardous” under federal regulations.
103
 
At a policy level, the varied scope of required disclosures is arguably the 
“most important of the differences among the various states’ 
regulations.”
104
 Naturally, proponents of fracking fluid regulation have 
called for the broadest possible disclosure requirements.
105
 Moreover, there 
are practical advantages to broad chemical disclosures.  
The first, and most obvious, benefit of a broad disclosure approach is 
that it provides the public and regulators with more information, which is a 
significant end to itself, even if the chemicals disclosed are not “hazardous” 
as defined by federal regulations. Additionally, there is a risk that limiting 
disclosures to “hazardous” chemicals will be underinclusive because the 
                                                                                                             
 99. Hall, supra note 6, at 425.  
 100. But see MONT. ADMIN. R. 36.22.608 (2018) (operators must disclose fluids to the 
state oil and gas board forty-eight hours before starting drilling). 
 101. See, e.g., Matthew McFeeley, Falling Through the Cracks: Public Information and 
the Patchwork of Hydraulic Fracturing Disclosure Laws, 38 VT. L. REV. 849, 853 (2014). 
 102. Id. at 885–86.  
 103. LA. ADMIN. CODE. tit. 43, pt. XIX § 118(C)(1)(d) (2015) (operators must disclose “a 
list of chemical ingredients contained in the hydraulic fracturing fluid that are subject to the 
requirements of 29 CFR Section 1910.1200(g)(2) . . . .”); MICH. DEP’T of ENVTL. QUALITY, 
SUPERVISOR OF WELLS INSTRUCTION 1-2011 (2011), https://www.michigan.gov/documents/ 
deq/Supervisor_of_Wells_Insruction_1-2011_428260_7.pdf (only requires the disclosure of 
Material Data Safety Sheets, which record “hazardous chemicals” under 29 C.F.R. § 
1910.1200).  
 104. Hall, supra note 6, at 410. 
 105. See, e.g., McFeeley, supra note 101, at 900.  
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federal regulations only require the inclusion of chemicals that are harmful 
to humans, not the environment.
106
 Finally, broader disclosures ultimately 
benefit fracking operators, because the public confidence in regulatory 
efforts that comes with greater transparency prevents more drastic measures 
like fracking bans, and operators still have the option to protect their trade 
secrets.
107
 Therefore, the predominant trend in state fracking fluid 
regulations is to require operators to disclose the identity and concentration 
of each chemical contained in their fluids. However, in any of these 
regulations, the true scope of the disclosure required is inherently limited by 
the regulation’s trade secret exception and the extent to which state 
regulators verify trade secret claims. 
3. Trade Secret Verification and Challenges 
Thus, despite the normative importance of the difference in scope 
between state fracking fluid regulations, the most varied and contentious 
difference between state regulatory schemes is the extent to which 
operators’ claims for trade secret protection are verified and the mechanism 
for challenging those claims (if any). While all states allow fracking 
operators to claim trade secret protection, they vary markedly on whether 
those claims must be verified, and whether regulators or private citizens 
have standing to challenge those claims through litigation or administrative 
proceedings.
108
 These variations are best illustrated through the regulatory 
schemes of four states, roughly classified on a spectrum from strictest to 
most lenient: Wyoming, Colorado, Texas, and Louisiana.  
As the first state to regulate fracking fluid disclosures,
109
 Wyoming 
requires upfront verification of trade secret claims.
110
 In Wyoming, a 
fracking operator must disclose the “stimulation fluid,” the “chemical 
compound name . . . of each additive used,” and the “proposed rate of 
concentration for each additive” to the state Oil and Gas Conservation 
Commission.
111
 To gain trade secret protection, the operator must “justify[] 
and document[] the nature and extent of the proprietary information.”
112
 
Practically, the Commission requires a two-part verification policy for trade 
secret claims—one part “providing justification for deeming all or part of 
                                                                                                             
 106. Hall, supra note 6, at 411. 
 107. See generally Furlow & Hays, supra note 4, at 317–19. 
 108. See, e.g., Pringle, supra note 87. 
 109. Id. 
 110. 055-3 WYO. CODE R. § 45(d)(i)–(vi) (2016).  
 111. Id. 
 112. Id. at § 45(f).  
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the formulation of a product to be a trade secret” and the second, 
“containing the product name, the product type, the CAS number for each 
chemical component of the product, and the concentration of the chemicals 
in the product.”
113
 If the Commission grants the operator’s trade secret 
claim, the second part is detached from the disclosure while the non-
proprietary information is made publicly available consistent with the 
Wyoming Public Records Act (“WPRA”).
114
 
Thus, because Wyoming’s existing fracking fluid regulations require 
written verification of trade secret claims, the WPRA provides a vehicle for 
plaintiffs to challenge the trade secret determination through public records 
litigation.
115
 For example, an environmental coalition concerned that the 
Commission was acting as a rubber stamp for fracking operators’ trade 
secret claims used this provision to challenge the Commission’s refusal to 
turn over fracking disclosures that it deemed trade secrets.
116
 The litigation 
reached the Wyoming Supreme Court and culminated in a settlement 
requiring the Commission to require greater factual support for trade secret 
claims made by fracking operators.
117
 
Similarly, Colorado requires fracking operators to disclose the identity 
and concentration of each chemical additive used in fracking fluids.
118
 
Moreover, Colorado requires that operators seeking to protect trade secrets 
submit a written claim of entitlement, but, importantly, they are not 
required to disclose the chemical identity or concentration of the claimed 
trade secret to the Colorado Oil and Gas Conservation Commission.
119
 
Thus, because the operator’s claim for trade secret protection only describes 
the essential elements of a trade secret
120
 and not the information itself, 
there is no clear vehicle for plaintiffs to challenge a trade secret claim 
                                                                                                             
 113. Powder River Basin Res. Council v. Wyo. Oil & Gas Conservation Comm’n, 2014 
WY 37, 320 P.3d 222, 225–26 (Wyo. 2014). 
 114. WYO. CODE R. § 45(f). 
 115. See WYO. STAT. ANN. § 16-4-203(f) (West 2019) (“Any person aggrieved by the 
failure of a governmental entity to release records” may challenge denial in district court and 
seek an order mandating disclosure).  
 116. Powder River Basin Res. Council, 320 P.3d at 245; see discussion infra Part III.  
 117. Stipulated Settlement Agreement at 3, Powder River Basin Res. Council v. Wyo. 
Oil & Gas Conservation Comm’n, Docket No. 94650-C (7th Judicial District Court, Jan. 14, 
2015).  
 118. See 2 COLO. CODE REGS. § 404-1:205A(b)(2)(A)(ix)–(xii) (2015).  
 119. Id. at § 404-1:205A(b)(2)(B).  
 120. COLO. OIL AND GAS CONSERVATION COMM’N, TRADE SECRET CLAIM OF 
ENTITLEMENT FORM 41 FILING, https://cogcc.state.co.us/forms/PDF_Forms/Form41_ 
05312012.pdf. 
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through public records litigation.
121
 Further, Colorado’s disclosure 
regulations do not include a means of challenging trade secrets.
122
 That 
said, Colorado’s regulations are unique in that they ultimately require 
fracking operators to disclose fluid additives “[u]nless the information is 
entitled to protection as a trade secret.”
123
 Commentators have suggested 
that the literal interpretation of this provision limits fracking operators to 
protecting true trade secrets and that plaintiffs could challenge a trade secret 
claim by claiming it was erroneous based on this interpretation.
124
 
However, to date, there has been no litigation on this point.  
Unlike Wyoming and Colorado, Texas does not require any written 
documentation or verification of a fracking operator’s claim for trade secret 
protection.
125
 Under Texas’s fracking fluid disclosure regulations, operators 
must upload their fluid compositions directly to FracFocus.
126
 Fracking 
operators may protect claimed trade secrets by excluding the information 
from FracFocus, but they must note the trade secret claim on the registry 
and provide “the chemical family or other similar description” for the 
protected formula.
127
 Because Texas, like Colorado, does not require 
fracking operators to submit the underlying chemical information to state 
regulators, there is no avenue for plaintiffs to challenge the trade secret 
claim through public records litigation.
128
  
However, Texas’s fracking fluid regulations expressly provide a 
mechanism for challenging trade secret claims.
129
 Specifically, a 
“landowner on whose property the relevant wellhead is located,” a 
“landowner who owns real property adjacent” to the wellhead, or a 
“department or agency of this state with jurisdiction over a matter to which 
the claimed trade secret information is relevant” may challenge the 
operator’s claim for trade secret protection.
130
 The regulation lays out a 
specific procedure for making a written challenge to the trade secret, which 
                                                                                                             
 121. See § 404-1:205A(b)(2)(B). 
 122. See § 404-1:205A. 
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 124. See Hall, supra note 6, at 415. 
 125. 16 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.29(c)(2)(C) (2012) (R.R. Comm’n of Tex., Hydraulic 
Fracturing Chemical Disclosure Requirements). 
 126. See id. at § 3.29(c)(2)(A). 
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is initially decided by the Texas Office of the Attorney General and is 
appealable to a state district court.
131
  
Although Louisiana has adopted regulations requiring the disclosure of 
fracking fluid composition, its regulations do not provide for the 
verification or challenge of fracking operators’ trade secret claims.
132
 
Louisiana allows fracking operators to disclose their fluid composition 
through state regulators or FracFocus, but it does not require the disclosure 
of chemical compositions that operators claim as trade secrets.
133
 Rather 
than submitting verification of their trade secret claims, Louisiana requires 
fracking operators to “disclose the chemical family associated with the 
ingredient” and include a “statement that a claim of trade secret protection 
has been made by the entity entitled to make such a claim” and “the contact 
information of the entity claiming trade secret protection.”
134
 Because 
Louisiana does not require operators to submit the protected information to 
regulators, there is no avenue for public records litigation.
135
 Moreover, 
unlike Texas, Louisiana’s disclosure regulations do not provide for trade 
secret challenges. 
Ultimately, state fracking fluid regulations are a true patchwork of laws 
with varying requirements. Each disclosure regulation creates tensions that 
have only deepened as the “shale revolution” has grown in magnitude and 
controversy. 
III. Key Tensions Between Disclosure Regulations and Trade Secrets 
There is an inherent conflict between trade secret protection, which 
depends on the information in question being “not generally known,”
136
 and 
the public’s right to know about the risks posed by fracking fluid 
pollution.
137
 This conflict shapes fracking disclosure regulations, and it is 
markedly visible in two key areas of tension. First, there is a tension 
between trade secrets and the public’s right to transparency that plays out 
through public records litigation and impacts the way state regulators verify 
trade secret claims. Second, there is the highly controversial tension 
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 132. See LA. ADMIN. CODE. tit. 43, pt. XIX § 118(C)(2) (2015). 
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 136. See UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(4) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1985). 
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between trade secrets and the medical community’s right to access chemical 
information that may be pertinent in the wake of a spill or explosion. 
A. Trade Secrets and the Threat of Public Records Litigation 
Under the most stringent disclosure regimes, regulators vet trade secret 
claims by requiring operators to submit the information they seek to protect. 
While this approach has the benefit of thoroughly screening trade secret 
claims and increasing the amount of publicly available information on 
fracking fluids, it also places the claimed trade secrets under government 
control. Thus, proprietary information is potentially subject to public 
records laws, the “quintessential symbols of government transparency” 
enacted in every state.
138
  
While environmental groups champion greater transparency through 
public records laws, fracking operators resist these regimes out of a fear 
that public records requests are a means for competitors to gain a 
competitive advantage through the disclosure of trade secrets.
139
 States have 
attempted to tackle this problem by exempting trade secrets from their 
public records statutes.
140
 However, when regulators hold the underlying 
fracking fluid information, there is still a risk of litigation because potential 
plaintiffs can request the information then challenge the regulator’s denial 
of the request claiming the trade secret determination is improper. It is 
precisely because of this risk that states like Colorado elect not to review 
the underlying information in evaluating trade secret claims under their 
fracking fluid disclosure regulations.
141
 
Indeed, shortly after enacting its fracking disclosure regulation, 
Wyoming found itself involved in public records litigation.
142
 Wyoming’s 
                                                                                                             
 138. John Delaney, Comment, Safeguarding Washington’s Trade Secrets: Protecting 
Businesses from Public Records Requests, 92 WASH. L. REV. 1905, 1909 (2017). 
 139. See generally Margaret B. Kwoka, FOIA, Inc., 65 DUKE L.J. 1361, 1379 (2016) 
(discussing the phenomenon of competitor firms using public records requests for 
commercial advantages). 
 140. See, e.g., 65 PA. STAT. ANN. § 67.708(b)(11) (West 2009) (“A record that 
constitutes or reveals a trade secret or confidential proprietary information” is exempt from 
state public records act).  
 141. 2 COLO. CODE REGS. § 404-1:205A, App. I (2012) (“[T]he requesting party could 
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trade secret designation. Although the trade secret claimant would likely intervene in the 
lawsuit . . . the [Commission] would nonetheless be a party and would have to devote 
resources to the litigation. Further, the requesting party could be entitled to its attorneys’ fees 
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 142. See Powder River Basin Res. Council, 320 P.3d at 226 .  
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fracking disclosure regulations include a trade secrets carveout, which 
protects proprietary information subject to the terms of the WPRA, the 
state’s public records law.
143
 In 2011, an environmental coalition submitted 
a request under the WPRA for unredacted versions of all undisclosed 
chemical information provided to the Commission by a host of fracking 
operators including Baker Hughes and Halliburton.
144
 The Commission 
responded with only redacted versions of the operators’ correspondence and 
justified its denial of the coalition’s request under the trade secrets 
exemption of the WPRA.
145
 The coalition filed two more requests, 
challenging the applicability of the trade secrets exemption and urging the 
commission to reconsider, both of which the Commission denied.
146
  
Subsequently, the groups filed a petition for review of administrative 
action under Wyoming’s Administrative Procedures Act (“APA”) in state 
district court.
147
 Halliburton intervened in the action, and the parties filed 
cross-motions for summary judgment.
148
 In deciding these motions, the 
district court considered its role to be reviewing “the [Commission’s] 
decision as an administrative decision” under the APA by determining 
whether the Commission’s determination was arbitrary or not in accord 
with the law.
149
 Deciding whether the Commission’s decision was in 
accordance with law required the district court to determine whether the 
chemical identity of fracking fluids qualified as a trade secret under the 
WPRA.
150
 Because the meaning of trade secret in the context of the WPRA 
was an open question, the court looked to three definitions of trade 
secrets—the definitions under the Federal Freedom of Information Act 
(“FOIA”), the Third Restatement of Unfair Competition, and the Uniform 
Trade Secrets Act— and concluded that the chemical information qualified 
under all three.
151
 Accordingly, the district court found that the Commission 
acted in accordance with law under the APA and granted summary 
judgment in favor of Wyoming and the fracking operators.
152
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The coalition appealed to the Wyoming Supreme Court. On appeal, the 
Court focused primarily on whether the district court had applied the 
correct standard of review in deciding the parties’ cross-motions for 
summary judgment.
153
 Ultimately, the Court concluded that the appropriate 
procedure for this challenge was under the WPRA, which allows any 
person denied access to a public record to apply to a district court for an 
order “directing the custodian of the record to show cause” for why the 
denial was proper.
154
 Thus, the Court found that the trial court erred in 
applying the administrative standard rather than “engag[ing] in an 
independent determination of whether the information withheld was entitled 
to trade secret protection under the WPRA.”
155
 The proper procedure for 
making this determination involves examining the disputed information and 
making a judgment as to whether the trade secret determination was correct 
through a show cause hearing with “a variety of tools to make evidentiary 
determinations,” including affidavits and in camera review of the contested 
records.
156
 Because of this procedural error, the Court reversed the trial 
court and remanded the case with instructions to conduct “appropriate 
proceedings” if the coalition successfully applied for a show cause order.
157
 
However, the Court was “unwilling to cast the district court adrift 
without some guidance on the standard to be applied in trade secret cases 
under the WPRA.”
158
 The Court highlighted the similarities between the 
WPRA and FOIA, including their shared premises that disclosure should 
generally prevail over secrecy and their liberal presumption that a denial of 
access to public records is contrary to public policy and should only be 
allowed with sufficient justification.
159
 Given these shared philosophies, the 
Court determined that the appropriate definition of trade secrets under the 
WPRA is the narrow definition used under FOIA.
160
 According to this 
definition, a trade secret is “a secret, commercially valuable plan, formula, 
process, or device that is used for the making, preparing, compounding, or 
processing of trade commodities and that can be said to be the end product 
of either innovation or substantial effort, with a direct relationship between 
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the trade secret and the productive process.”
161
 Because the Court lacked a 
full record, it left the question of whether this definition applied to the 
information at issue in this case for the district court.
162
  
On remand, however, the district court never reached this question. 
Rather, the parties reached a stipulated settlement agreement, under which 
the Oil and Gas Conservation Commission agreed to a more stringent 
process for vetting fracking operators’ trade secret claims.
163
 Specifically, 
the settlement agreement requires the Commission to adopt a detailed 
review process that places the onus of gaining trade secret protection on 
fracking operators by requiring documentation of issues like the steps taken 
to protect the supposed trade secret and the ease with which the formula of 




While Wyoming’s approach to evaluating fracking operators’ trade 
secret claims is among the most rigorous in the country, the Powder River 
Basin case illustrates the risk of litigation that comes with the tension 
between public records laws that favor broad transparency and the 
operators’ interest in protecting their valuable trade secrets from being 
destroyed through disclosure. When state regulators opt to take custody of 
the claimed trade secrets for vetting, the balancing of these interests 
requires courts to “to review the disputed information on a case-by-case, 
record-by-record, or perhaps even on an operator-by-operator basis.”
165
 
This process, which is arguably necessary to achieving broad disclosure, 
strains state resources and forces states like Colorado to abstain from 
individually evaluating trade secret claims. 
B. Trade Secrets and the Medical Community’s Right to Know  
Health and safety concerns are at the core of the movement for greater 
transparency in fracking. The potentially harmful impact of slickwater 
fluids on drinking water is the “most contentious” issue in the public debate 
over fracking,
166
 and calls for greater disclosure are most pronounced 
following disasters like the Monroe County incident.
167
 As a result, most 
states that regulate fracking fluid disclosure require operators to provide 
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chemical information to emergency responders and medical personnel 
irrespective of the information’s status as a trade secret.
168
 However, these 
provisions generally restrict disclosure of the information beyond the 
immediate treatment and require medical personnel to sign non-disclosure 
agreements.
169
 Moreover, these laws often “tie in a ban with harsh penalties 
against any disclosure of the formula by the physician.”
170
 
The restrictive nature of these regulations has drawn the ire of the 
medical community, and this conflict has boiled over to litigation. In 
Pennsylvania, Dr. Alfonso Rodriguez, a nephrologist, sought to invalidate 
the state’s “Medical Gag Rules” on fracking fluid disclosures because they 
were an impermissible content-based restriction on his First Amendment 
rights.
171
 Specifically, Dr. Rodriguez sought to invalidate §§ 10 and 11 of 
Pennsylvania’s fracking chemical disclosure statute
172
 because they 
interfered with his ethical obligations by preventing him from readily 
communicating “which toxins a hemodialysis patient may have been 
exposed to.”
173
 The district court dismissed Dr. Rodriguez’s claim, 
concluding that he lacked standing because his claimed injuries were 
conjectural and that, even if he had an injury-in-fact, he lacked standing 
because his complaint focused on water quality and invalidating the “gag 
rules” would not provide him that information.
174
 Although commentators 
were critical of the district court’s dismissal of Dr. Rodriguez’s strong First 
Amendment claim,
175
 the Third Circuit ultimately affirmed the dismissal.
176
  
While Pennsylvania’s “gag rule” laws survived Dr. Rodriguez’s 
challenge in federal court, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court declared them 
unconstitutional in 2016, less than two years after the Third Circuit 
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affirmed the dismissal of Dr. Rodriguez’s case.
177
 In Robinson Township, a 
group of municipalities, interest groups, and individuals, including 
physicians, collectively referred to by the Court as “Citizens,” launched a 
broad challenge on Act Thirteen, Pennsylvania’s oil and gas statute on the 




The Citizens challenged multiple provisions of Act Thirteen, including 
§§ 3222.1(b)(10) and (b)(11), which restricted “medical professionals’ 
access to information about chemicals used in the fracking process” that 
fracking operators claimed to be trade secrets or confidential, proprietary 
information.
179
 Section 10 governed medical providers’ right to access 
fracking fluid information and the normal course of treatment, and section 
11 governed emergency disclosures.
180
 The Court ultimately concluded that 
both provisions foreclosed “health professionals from disclosing to other 
health care professionals any clinical findings they make during the course 
of treating a patient.”
181
 Moreover, according to the Court, §§ 10 and 11 
improperly restricted physicians’ ability to “to facilitate the development of 
effective future treatment plans for such exposures” through publication in 
medical journals.
182
 Because these “sweeping” restrictions were only 
afforded to the oil and gas industry, the Court concluded that they were 
“special laws” and that “no manifest peculiarity” justified their unique 
application to fracking.
183
 Thus, the Court deemed the provisions 
unconstitutional and enjoined their further application and enforcement. 
Robinson Township was a victory for the citizen groups challenging 
Pennsylvania’s oil and gas statute, but it ultimately left all parties involved 
with more uncertainty than progress. While the Pennsylvania Supreme 
Court invalidated the “medical gag rules” on state constitutional grounds, it 
did not provide the legislature with guidance on properly regulating the 
disclosure of fracking fluid compositions in the medical context. In this 
sense, Robinson Township is a symptom of the larger conflict surrounding 
trade secrets and the regulation of fracking fluids and the uncertainty that 
comes with handling an issue of major public concern through a patchwork 
of state regulations. 
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IV. Fracking Patents—The Way Forward? 
As the tension between trade secrets and fracking disclosures appears 
increasingly intractable, there is a growing trend of promoting compromise 
through an entirely different area of intellectual property law—the law of 
patents.  
While fracking operators have turned to the patent system since 
Stanolind developed the technology in 1948,
184
 the shale revolution 
originated in a time when the fracking sector was “fundamentally patent 
free.”
185
 Since that time, however, the number of fracking patents issued by 
the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (“USPTO”) has increased 
substantially.
186




Several commentators have pointed to fracking patents as the proper 
means of resolving the conflict between trade secret protections and 
fracking disclosure regulations.
188
 This contention is not without merit. 
After all, patents are a tool of compromise. To promote “the progress of 
science and the arts,”
189
 Congress established the patent system to grant 
inventors private, limited monopolies in exchange for “full disclosure of the 
patented invention and its dedication to the public on the expiration of the 
patent.”
190
 This compromise is frequently referred to as the “quid pro quo of 
the patent monopoly.”
191
 The patent quid pro quo is preferable to the 
current system of protecting fracking fluids through trade secrets because it 
strikes a compromise that is advantageous to all parties involved. With a 
limited monopoly, fracking operators can enforce their intellectual property 
rights and maintain a competitive advantage, and the disclosure mandated 
by patent law provides citizen groups and regulators with detailed 
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information on the chemical additives used in fracking. However, there are 
significant legal and practical obstacles that make fracking patents 
untenable as a complete alternative to trade secret protection.   
A. The Advantages of Fracking Patents 
Overall, the use of patents to protect fracking fluids, as opposed to trade 
secrets, provides relative advantages to all parties involved. 
Compared to trade secrets, patents provide fracking operators with 
stronger, more readily enforceable intellectual property protections. 
Because trade secrets depend on secrecy for legal protection, they “stand 
ready to be lost forever on the whim of a third party, by inadvertent or 
intentional disclosure.”
192
 Conversely, disclosure is a requirement for patent 
protection.
193
 If a proper disclosure is made and a patent is granted, the 
patentee has the right to prevent all others from making, using, selling, or 
offering to sell the invention within the United States.
194
 While trade secrets 
are only protectable against “misappropriation,” fracking operators can 
enforce their rights against other parties that infringe their claimed 
invention irrespective of whether the party created the invention 
independently.
195
 As a result of the increase in “fracking patents,” fracking 
operators have increasingly utilized broad patent protection to pursue 
claims of infringement against competitors that have infringed on patented 
fluid technology.
196
 Simply put, the protection available to patentees is 
broader than the protection available through the law of trade secrets, which 




Patents also provide fracking operators with greater economic incentives 
than trade secrets. While trade secrets can serve as a tool of innovation,
198
 
there is no novelty requirement for trade secret protection.
199
 Alternatively, 
novelty is an integral requirement of patent protection.
200
 Therefore, to gain 
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patent protection for a fluid technology, a fracking operator will need to 
develop a “new and unique” fluid composition.
201
 While trade secret law 
provides operators with an incentive to develop unique fluids through the 
promise of protection against misappropriation, the possibility of a patent 
monopoly and the greater protection that comes with it would likely 
incentivize operators to develop better, more advanced fluids. Moreover, 
because patents can be easily licensed, operators could add a revenue 
stream by developing advanced fluids for particular shale formations and 




Likewise, the patent system offers substantial benefits to those who 
would prefer broader disclosure of fracking fluid information. Under the 
current regulatory patchwork, even the most comprehensive fluid 
disclosures offer an incomplete picture of the chemical make-up of fracking 
fluids.
203
 However, to obtain patent protection, an operator would need to 
provide a full, clear, and exact written description of the invention with 
sufficient information to enable a person “skilled in the art” to make and 
use the invention.
204
 Accordingly, fracking patent applications provide 
more useful information than any existing disclosure regulation. Moreover, 
patent law aligns the interests of fracking operators and regulators in two 
meaningful ways. First, the patent law includes a limited safe harbor for 
individuals using an invention that would otherwise infringe a claimed 
invention if the use is in good faith and more than one year before the 
patentee filed their application or publicly disclosed their invention.
205
 By 
design, this defense incentivizes would-be patentees to file an application as 
early as possible. In the context of fracking fluids, operators would have an 
incentive to file a patent application as soon as they had a completed 
formulation. In addition to expanding the scope of the fracking operator’s 
patent rights, this early filing would provide regulators and citizens with 
comprehensive fluid information either immediately before the fracking 
began or shortly after. Second, because the patent system places the burden 
of disclosure on the party seeking protection, rather than on a state 
regulator, the tension of public records litigation and the accompanying 
strain on state resources would be eased significantly.  
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B. Obstacles to Patent Law as a Viable Alternative to Trade Secrecy 
Despite the advantages of fracking patents over trade secrets, there are 
significant legal and practical obstacles that will likely prevent the patent 
system from supplanting trade secrets as a viable means of protecting fluid 
composition for most fracking operators. 
1. Legal Obstacles 
To successfully obtain a patent, an applicant must meet five 
requirements: (1) the subject matter must be patentable under § 101 of the 
patent act; (2) the claimed invention must have utility; the claimed 
invention must be (3) novel and (4) nonobvious; and (5) the applicant must 
disclose the claimed invention with sufficient detail in a written 
specification.
206
 Of these requirements, utility is unlikely to be an issue in 
the context of fracking fluids because a patent will only be withheld on 
utility grounds if it “has no practical utility.”
207
 Moreover, fracking fluids 
are likely patentable as a “composition of matter” under § 101.
208
 Assuming 
that the operator provides an adequate disclosure with their application, 
non-obviousness and novelty remain the most likely legal obstacles to 
patentability for fracking fluids. 
The non-obvious requirement asks whether the claimed invention is 
enough of technological advance to warrant patent protection. More 
specifically, non-obviousness is a question of whether the claimed 
invention is an advance over the existing body of publicly available 
inventions, known as the prior art, as judged by a “person having 
reasonable skill in the art.”
209
 This requirement is considered by many to be 
the “ultimate condition of patentability,” and it is at the heart of the patent 
quid pro quo.
210
 Evaluating the non-obviousness of a claimed invention 
requires determining the scope and content of the prior art, assessing the 
differences between the claimed invention, and resolving the level of 
ordinary skill in the art.
211
 In the context of fracking fluids, the prior art is 
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significantly limited by the prevailing trend of protecting fluid formulas as 
trade secrets. Therefore, because fracking fluid formulas generally vary by 
well and formation, operators should be able to clear this hurdle if their 
claimed fluid differs from the body of publicly available formulas in a way 
that would not be obvious to an operator of reasonable skill in the art of 
composing fracking fluids.  
The novelty requirement is, however, the largest legal obstacle to patent 
protection for most fracking operators. Like non-obviousness, novelty is “at 
the heart of the patent system.”
212
 Novelty is a question of whether a 
claimed invention is new, as determined by the prior art. Historically, 
novelty has been covered under § 102 of the patent act, along with the 
related concept of “statutory bars,” which set out actions by the inventor 
that preclude a patent from issuing. However, under the America Invents 
Act (“AIA”), § 102 was simplified, and removed the distinction between 
novelty bars and statutory bars.
213
 That said, in the wake of the AIA, the 
Supreme Court held that the revisions to § 102 did not change the meaning 
of previously interpreted terms like “on sale,” so pre-AIA caselaw is useful 
in interpreting and applying § 102 bars.
214
 
Presently, an invention is barred from patentability due to a novelty bar if 
“the claimed invention was patented, described in a printed publication, or 
in public use, on sale, or otherwise available to the public before the 
effective filing date of the claimed invention.”
215
 However, in limited 
circumstances, a so-called grace period is available if the prior art 
disclosure occurred one year or less before the applicant filed to patent their 
claimed invention.
216
 If every element of the claimed invention is disclosed 
in the prior art under § 102(a)(1), it is said to be “anticipated” and, 
therefore, non-novel. 
For fracking operators, the most important form of prior art is “public 
use.” In this context, public use is “any use of [the claimed] invention by a 
person . . . who is under no limitation, restriction or obligation of secrecy to 
the inventor.”
217
 While the use of fracking fluids on a well is not within 
most common definitions of public, the Fifth Circuit established that the 
touchstone of publicity is the lack of “deliberate efforts” to conceal the 
invention and protect its secrecy in the landmark case of Rosaire v. Baroid 
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Sales Division National. Lead Co.
218
 Rosaire involved the use of crude oil 
drilling technology in rural east Texas.
219
 Ultimately, the court determined 
that the use was public, even though it was geographically isolated, because 
it was “performed in the field under ordinary conditions without any 
deliberate attempt at concealment or effort to exclude the public and 
without any instructions of secrecy to the employees performing the 
work.”
220
 Therefore, any unrestricted use of the claimed fluid technology 
would be a prior art disclosure that anticipates the claimed invention unless 
an exception applies under § 102(b). However, most fracking operators are 
in a fundamentally different situation than the drillers in Rosaire because 
fracking operators typically insist on strict trade secret protection for their 
fluid formulas. Therefore, it is unlikely that there will be public use in the 
prior art by a third-party fracking operator that creates a novelty bar for a 
given formula.  
That said, the bigger problem in this context is the applicant’s own 
“secret public use.” Specifically, “an inventor’s own prior commercial use, 
albeit kept secret, may constitute a public use . . . barring him from 
obtaining a patent.”
221
 This rule serves to channel inventions into the patent 
system by forcing inventors to choose between the patent system or trade 
secrecy, thereby “foster[ing] disclosure of patented inventions to the 
public.”
222
 Practically, this means that any fracking operator that has used a 
fracking fluid commercially for extraction, even under strict trade secrecy, 
will be barred from patenting the fluid unless they file within a year of the 
first commercial use.
223
 While there is a limited exception for experimental 
uses,
224
 the bar triggered by an inventor’s prior commercial use will 
preclude many fracking operators from obtaining a patent on their existing 
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Because of § 102’s bar on prior commercial use, current fracking 
operators will not be able to gain patent protection for fluid technologies 
currently in use unless they file within one year of the first use of the fluid. 
This bar effectively limits the utility of patents as a means of protecting 
fracking fluids to new fracking fluids. 
2. Practical Obstacles  
Even if fracking fluids are patentable, there are practical obstacles that 
make it unlikely that many operators will abandon their trade secret claims 
in favor of patent protection.  
The first obstacle is the process of obtaining a patent through the 
USPTO, which is known as patent prosecution. The prosecution process 
typically involves several rounds of amendments and negotiations with the 
USPTO, and the process takes, on average, over two years to complete.
226
 
Although roughly three-quarters of all patent applications are ultimately 
granted, the prosecution process is inarguably time-consuming and 
costly.
227
 The prolonged nature of prosecution makes the patent system a 
poor fit for fracking operators, many of whom alter their formulas from 
well to well and do not perfect their formula in advance of the drilling 
operation.
228
 Due to the inconsistent nature of fracking fluid formulas, 
many operators will likely prefer to continue protecting their intellectual 
property through trade secrecy, which requires no application and is created 
contemporaneously with the secret. 
Moreover, practical problems with enforcement will likely dissuade 
many fracking operators from making the transition from trade secrecy to 
patents. Because most fracking fluids are protected vigilantly as trade 
secrets, and the fluids themselves are injected into the ground, it will be 
exceedingly difficult for patentees to detect infringement in the market. 
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Commentators have dismissed this concern by arguing that the inability to 
enforce patent rights will result in only “somewhat less of a competitive 
advantage” because the patent system will still incentivize the creation of 
more efficient fluid technology.
229
 However, the entire premise of the patent 
quid pro quo is that the patentee gains a monopoly over their invention in 
exchange for disclosing the information to the public. If enforcement is 
impossible, the monopoly ceases to exist, and fracking operators will have 
no incentive to develop more efficient technologies to license to 
competitors. Moreover, any incentives gained from patenting a fracking 
fluid formula must be measured against the costs of patent prosecution. 
Without the possibility of enforcing their patent and recouping the fixed 
costs of development and prosecution, fracking operators have little reason 
to choose patents over trade secret protections. 
In short, patents are superior to trade secrets as a means of protecting 
fracking fluid technology because they allow operators to maintain their 
rights while facilitating thorough disclosure for regulators and private 
citizens. Nevertheless, it is unlikely that patents will serve as a viable 
alternative to trade secrets industrywide because many operators will be 
unable or unwilling to abandon their trade secret protections in favor of 
fracking patents.  
V. Conclusion 
The tension between fracking disclosure regulations and trade secret 
protection for fluid compositions is unresolved. While state fracking 
regulations have expanded over the past two decades, the public’s 
knowledge of fluid compositions remains incomplete, largely because of 
the inherent conflict between proprietary information and the public’s right 
to know. The growing trend of fracking patents eases this tension and 
strikes a more favorable balance between protection and disclosure. 
However, because of the immense legal and practical obstacles to 
patentability facing most fracking operators, patents are ultimately an 
incomplete resolution to this problem. 
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